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GOVERNMENT COUNTERCLAIMS AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATIONS
IN GOVERNMENT CONTRACT DISPUTES
Those who enter into fixed-price supply contracts1 with the fed-
eral government must accept a number of special contract terms.
Among these terms is a disputes clause2 requiring the contractor to
forego initial resort to the courts3 and to submit all disputes with the
THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS NOTE:
Pasley, The S & E Contractors Case-Beheading the Hydra or Wreaking Devasta-
tion?, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1 [hereinafter cited as Pasley];
Spector, Disputes Arising in Connection with Contract Performance-A Comment
on the Report of the Commission on Government Procurement, 33 Fm. BJ. 160 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Spector].
1. See 32 C.F.R. § 7.103 (1974); 41 C.F.R. § 1-7.102 (1974).
2. The text of the standard disputes clause is as follows:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this contract, any dispute concerning
a question of fact arising under this contract which is not disposed of by agree-
ment shall be decided by the Contracting Officer, who shall reduce his decision
to writing and mail or otherwise furnish a copy thereof to the Contractor. The
decision of the Contracting Officer shall be final and conclusive unless within
30 days from the date of receipt of such copy, the Contractor mails or other-
wise furnishes to the Contracting Officer a written appeal addressed to the
Secretary. The decision of the Secretary or his duly authorized representative
for the determination of such appeals shall be final and conclusive unless deter-
mined by a court of competent jurisdiction to have been fraudulent, or capri-
cious, or arbitrary, or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith,
or not supported by substantial evidence. In connection with any appeal pro-
ceeding under this clause, the Contractor shall be afforded an opportunity to
be heard and to offer evidence in support of its appeal. Pending final decision
of a dispute hereunder, the Contractor shall proceed diligently with the per-
formance of the contract and in accordance with the Contracting Officer's de-
cision.
(b) This "Disputes" clause does not preclude consideration of law ques-
tions in connection with decisions provided for in paragraph (a), above: Pro-
vided, That nothing in this contract shall be construed as making final the deci-
sion of any administrative official, representative, or board on a question of
law. 32 C.F.R. § 7.103-12 (1974); 41 C.F.R. § 1-7.102-12 (1974).
3. If it were not for the disputes clause, every failure by the government to comply
with its contractual obligations would be a breach of contract which could form the basis
of a court's original jurisdiction. Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. United States, 345 F.2d 833,
837 (Ct. Cl. 1965). Included in claims which "arise under" a disputes clause and are
therefore subject to initial administrative determination are those claims asserted under
other contract clauses which provide for equitable adjustments of price and time upon
the occurrence of certain conditions. Crown Coat Front Co. v. United States, 386 U.S.
503, 505-06 (1967). One such clause is the standard changes clause, which empowers
the government's contracting officer to order certain modifications in the supply contract
with a consequent failure to agree upon the resulting adjustment in price or the per-
formance schedule becoming a dispute concerning a question of fact within the scope
of the disputes clause. For the typical format of a changes clause, see 32 C.F.R. §
7.103-2 (1974); 41 C.F.R. § 1-7.102-2 (1974). This clause is one of those required
in all government supply contracts by 32 C.F.R. § 7.103 (1974) and 41 C.F.R. § 1-
7.102 (1974), respectively.
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government arising under the disputes clause to the government's ar-
bitration machinery. 4  The disputes clause further provides that ad-
ministrative determinations of fact are final unless a court of competent
jurisdiction finds that certain limited standards of fairness have been
violated.
In considering cases arising under the disputes clause, the courts
have sometimes been presented with conflicting considerations of fair-
ness and statutorily-prescribed finality.5 The administrative procedure
for resolving contract disputes is generally regarded by commentators
as favoring the government at the expense of complete fairness to the
contractor.6 Nevertheless, courts are restricted from redressing this
imbalance by the finality provisions of the Wunderlich Act,7 which
prescribe limited standards by which a court may review an adminis-
trative decision. In an attempt to make the contractor more equal with
the government, the Supreme Court, in S & E Contractors, Inc. v.
United States," recently interpreted the finality policy of the Wunder-
lich Act as prohibiting even indirect judicial challenge by the govern-
ment to any part of its own administrative determination.9 The broad
language of this decision can be read as making the contractor more
than equal in court by preventing the government from challenging any
part of the administrative decision even when a contractor initiates judi-
cial review of a partially favorable administrative determination ren-
dered under a disputes clause.'" However, in the 1974 decision of
Roscoe-Ajax Construction Co. v. United States," the Court of Claims
rejected such an interpretation of S & E Contractors and held that, in
certain limited situations, the government has the right to assert a
counterclaim when the contractor initiates judicial review of an admin-
istrative decision partially favorable to him.:2
4. "[A]ny dispute concerning a question of fact arising under the contract shall
be decided in the first instance by the contracting officer, with the right of the contractor
to appeal to the head of the contracting agency or his designated representative, which
in practice usually means a board of contract appeals." Pasley 2. See also Schultz,
Wunderlich Revisited: New Limits on Judicial Review of Administrative Determination
of Government Contract Disputes, 29 LAw & CoNTEmP. PROB. 115, 115-16 (1964).
5. See Wunderlich Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 321-22 (1970), the text of which is set forth
in note 20 infra.
6. See note 67 infra and accompanying text.
7. 41 U.S.C. §§ 321-22 (1970).
8. 406 U.S. 1 (1972). For a more complete discussion of this case, see notes 31-
40 infra and accompanying text.
9. Id. at 4, 13-14.
10. See Dynalectron Corp. v. United States, 199 Ct. C1. 996 (1972), discussed at
notes 41-43 infra and accompanying text.
11. 499 F.2d 639 (Ct. Cl. 1974). See notes 44-58 infra and accompanying text.
12. Id. at 646.
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This Note will discuss and critically evaluate the conditions that
the Roscoe-Ajax opinion laid down for permitting government counter-
claims. The court's guidelines will be analyzed in terms of the often
conflicting policies of finality of administrative decision-making and
fairness to both the contractor and the government. Initially, the
standards for judicial review of disputes clause determinations as they
have developed over the years will be briefly set forth. Then the Su-
preme Court's interpretation of the present judicial review standard will
be examined for its effect on the right of the government to challenge
its own administrative disputes decision. Finally, recent decisions of
the Court of Claims considering the right of the government to chal-
lenge any part of the administrative decision in a contractor-initiated
judicial appeal will be discussed and critically evaluated.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE STANDARDS FOR REVIEW
Traditionally, the Supreme Court had taken a liberal view of the
authority which the pre-Wunderlich Act disputes clause vested in ad-
ministrative decision-makers to resolve questions falling within its pur-
view. 13 Until the early 1950's, it could be stated as an "established
13. See Note, Government Contracts: Court of Claims Circumvents Bianchi's Pro-
hibition of De Novo Review by Narrow Interpretation of Disputes Clause, 1965 DUKE
L.J. 654, 656.
In its initial confrontation with a disputes clause, the Supreme Court in Kihlberg
v. United States, 97 U.S. 398 (1878), upheld the validity of a provision vesting final
authority in a government quartermaster to fix distances not clearly specified in the con-
tract on the basis of which the private contractor was to be paid for his transportation
costs. The Court then enunciated, albeit in dictum, the standard of judicial review
which formed the basis for the decision of subsequent disputes cases in the federal
courts: "[I]n the absence of fraud or such gross mistake as would necessarily imply
bad faith, or a failure to exercise an honest judgment, -his action in the premises is con-
clusive upon the appellant [contractor] as well as upon the government." Id. at 402.
Several subsequent cases dealing with government contract disputes applied this standard
of review to administrative determinations of fact. See, e.g., Ripley v. United States,
223 U.S. 695 (1912); United States v. Gleason, 175 U.S. 588 (1900); Sweeney v. United
States, 109 U.S. 618 (1883); Carroll v. United States, 76 Ct. Cl. 103 (1932); Penn
Bridge Co. v. United States, 59 Ct. Cl. 892 (1924). Later cases added a substantial
evidence test. See, e.g., Penner Installation Corp. v. United States, 89 F. Supp. 545,
547 (Ct. Cl.), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided court, 340 U.S. 898 (1950);
Mitchell Canneries, Inc. v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 498 (Ct. Cl. 1948); Loftis v.
United States, 76 F. Supp. 816 (Ct. Cl. 1948); Needles v. United States, 101 Ct. Cl.
535, 607 (1944). Another line of authority, this one intermixed with private contract
cases, reaffirmed the Kihlberg dictum that the disputes decision was equally binding
upon both parties to the contract although the challenge in most cases, predictably, was
by the private contractor. See, e.g., United States v. Mason & Hanger Co., 260 U.S.
323, 326 (1922); Sheffield & Birmingham Coal, Iron & Ry. Co. v. Gordon, 151 U.S.
285 (1894); Martinsburg & Potomac R. Co. v. March, 114 U.S. 549, 554 (1885); Cen-
tral Trust Co. v. Louisville, St. L. & T. Ry., 70 F. 282 (C.C.D. Ky. 1895); Albina Ma-
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principle of law" that factual determinations under disputes clause pro-
cedures were binding "upon both the Government and the contractor"
in the absence of "fraud, gross error or arbitrariness . . . amounting
to bad faith" if there was "substantial evidence to support such find-
ings,"'1 4 while decisions on questions of law would not be given such
finality.' 5 Then, in United States v. Moorman'6 and United States v.
Wunderlich,17 the Supreme Court severely restricted judicial review.
In Moorman, the Court held that agency decisions rendered under a
disputes clause in a government contract were final on questions of law
as well as on questions of fact where the contract so provided.'" In
Wunderlich, the Court held that, absent a showing of fraud, narrowly
defined as "conscious wrongdoing, an intention to cheat or be dis-
honest," by a contracting officer or a board of contract appeals, the
mere finding that a decision was arbitrary, capricious, or grossly er-
roneous was insufficient to overturn its finality.' 9
Congress responded to this drastic reduction in the standard of ju-
dicial review by enacting the Wunderlich Act.2 0  This Act provides that
rine Iron Works, Inc. v. United States, 79 CL Cl. 714 (1934); Yale & Towne Mfg. Co.
v. United States, 58 Ct. Cl. 633 (1923). For a comprehensive treatment of these cases
and others, see S & E Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 406 U.S. 1, 32-44 (1972)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
14. Mitchell Canneries, Inc. v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 498, 502 (Ct. Cl. 1948).
15. See, e.g., Moorman v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 1010 (Ct. Cl. 1949), rev'd,
338 U.S. 457 (1950); Pfotzer v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 390 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied,
335 U.S. 885 (1948).
16. 338 U.S. 457 (1950). In Moorman, the contractor entered into a contract with
the government to grade the site of a proposed aircraft assembly plant. The dispute
arose over whether the contractor was required to grade a certain taxiway, which was
shown in the drawings which constituted a part of the contract, but which was not lo-
cated within the plant site as described in the specifications. The contractor graded the
taxiway and its claim for additional compensation was rejected by the contracting officer
and the Secretary of War. The Court of Claims awarded a money judgment for the
contractor but the Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the Secretary's decision.
Moorman v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 1010 (Ct. Cl. 1949), rev'd, 338 U.S. 457 (1950).
17. 342 U.S. 98 (1951). In Wunderlich, several disputes arose under a contract
providing for the construction of a dam. The Court of Claims set aside the decision
of the department head, the Secretary of the Interior, but the Supreme Court reversed
and reinstated the departmental decision. Wunderlich v. United States, 117 Ct. Cl. 92
(1950), rev'd, 342 U.S. 98 (1951).
18. 338 U.S. at 462-63.
19. 342 U.S. at 100. In addition to eliminating several review criteria, the Court's
narrow definition of fraud also introduced elements of intent which had not been re-
garded as essential in prior cases. Those cases took the position that "no question of
personal animosity or calculated bias, prejudice or actual dishonesty is necessarily in-
volved in an ultimate finding of implied bad faith." See Needles v. United States, 101
Ct. Cl. 535, 602 (1944).
20. 41 U.S.C. §§ 321-22 (1970). The Act reads as follows:
§ 321. No provision of any contract entered into by the United States, relating
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government contracts shall not contain provisions purporting to make
final administrative decisions as to questions of law,21 and that factual
findings shall be final and conclusive unless found to be "fraudulent
or capricious or arbitrary or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply
bad faith, or. . .not supported by substantial evidence" 22 by a court
of competent jurisdiction. 28  In effect, this statute reinstated the
to the finality or conclusiveness of any decision of the head of any department
or agency or his duly authorized representative or board in a dispute involving
a question arising under such contract, shall be pleaded in any suit now filed
or to be filed as limiting judicial review of any such decision to cases where
fraud by such official or his said representative or board is alleged: Provided,
however, That any such decision shall be final and conclusive unless the same
is fradulent [sic] or capricious or arbitrary or so grossly erroneous as neces-
sarily to imply bad faith, or is not supported by substantial evidence.
§ 322. No Government contract shall contain a provision making final on a
question of law the decision of any administrative official, representative, or
board. Id. (footnote omitted).
In the Wunderlich case, the Court invited just such a legislative response: "If the
standard of fraud that we adhere to is too limited, that is a matter for Congress." 342
U.S. at 100. The report of the Judicary Committee which accompanied the Wunderlich
Act to the floor of the House demonstrates that Congress indeed intended the Act to
be a direct rebuttal of the positions espoused in the Wunderlich and Moorman cases:
The purpose of the proposed legislation. . . is to overcome the effect of the
Supreme Court decision in the case of United States v. Wunderlich ....
H.R. REP. No. 1380, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1954).
The validity of a contract provision reserving to Government officials the
right to determine legal questions has been upheld by the Supreme Court in
United States v. Moorman ....
* . . Section 2 of the proposed legislation will prohibit the inclusion of
such reservation in future contracts. . . . Id. at 5.
21. 41 U.S.C. § 322 (1970).
22. Id. § 321. "Substantial evidence" is a term of art which goes to the reasonable-
ness of what the agency did on the basis of the evidence before it. The reviewing court
examines only the administrative record, "for a decision may be supported by substantial
evidence even though it could be refuted by other evidence that was not presented to
the decision-making body." United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709, 715
(1963). This test is clearly consistent with the Court of Claims' role as an appellate
tribunal in Wunderlich cases. See note 23 infra.
23. "The Wunderlich Act, which is the basic document for judicial review of Gov-
ernment contract determinations, is as its language indicates a finality statute, not a ju-
risdictional statute." Jaffe, Administrative Finality on fudicial Review, 2 PUB. CoN-
TRACTS L.J. 115, 116 (1968). The Court of Claims, which hears most disputes clause
cases, is given jurisdiction in this area by the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (Supp. II
1972), amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 1491, 1503 (1970), which provides in pertinent part that
"[tjhe Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment on any claim against
the United States founded ...upon any express or implied contract with the United
States . . . ," id. § 1491 (Supp. II 1972) (emphasis added), and further that "[t]he
Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any set-off or demand
by the United States against any plaintiff in such court," id. § 1503 (1970).
A trio of Supreme Court decisions, in conjunction with the administrative proce-
dures detailed by the disputes clause and the criteria for review set forth in the Wunder-
lich Act, have transformed the Court of Claims from its original role as a trial court
under the Tucker Act into what must be realistically regarded as an appellate tribunal
when dealing with claims "arising under" the contract. United States v. Anthony Grace
& Sons, Inc., 384 U.S. 424 (1966) (holding that when a board of contract appeals im-
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broader review criteria which were applied in government contract dis-
putes cases prior to the Moorman and Wunderlich decisions. 24
INTERPRETATION OF THE WUNDERLIcII ACT-
S & E CONTRACTORS
Presumably, neither the Moorman and Wunderlich decisions nor
the Wunderlich Act had any impact upon the prevailing rule that
administrative decisions on questions of fact in contract dispute cases
properly dismisses an appeal on grounds the Court of Claims later rejects, that court
cannot hold a trial de novo but rather the factual issues to be resolved must be remanded
to the board for initial determination); United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co.,
384 U.S. 394 (1966) (holding that a finding of fact by a board of contract appeals rele-
vant to its decision on a matter governed by a disputes clause is binding on the Court
of Claims in a subsequent breach suit which was not within the scope of the disputes
clause); United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709 (1963) (holding that apart
from questions of fraud, the Court of Claims may not receive new evidence in determin-
ing the finality to be attached to an administrative disputes decision under Wunderlich
Act standards but rather must confine itself to review of the record that was before the
agency); see Crown Coat Front Co. v. United States, 386 U.S. 503, 513 (1967); An-
thony & White, Contract Suit Practice and Procedure in the United States Court of
Claims, 49 NoTaR DAME LAw. 276, 279 (1973); Pasley 24; Williams, Use of Dispositive
Motions Before Government Boards of Contract Appeals, 5 PuB. CoNrAc'rs LJ. 151,
157 (1972). This transformation has led two critical commentators to argue that
the system of use of Commissioners in contract appeal cases is outmoded. A
Commissioner's role in American jurisprudence has traditionally been like that
of a master, that is to hear evidence and to draft findings of fact and recom-
mended decisions on the basis of the evidence heard for later consideration byjudges. In the vast majority of contract cases coming to the court today, there
is no evidence to hear but only a cold administrative record to legally review.
The continuation of the use of Commissioners in contract cases strongly
suggests that the court has not yet clearly perceived nor accepted its role as
an appellate rather than trial court in this area....
t . .e[Ilt is clear that the Court of Claims has been scrambling for ways
to protect its ability to react to factual situations unhindered by the standard
tests for appellate review of administrative proceedings, i.e., "supported by sub-
stantial evidence." King & Little, Critique of Public Construction Contract
Remedies With Recommended Changes, 5 PuB. CoNTRAcTS LJ. 1, 6-7 (1972).
The rulemaking power of the Court of Claims, see 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1970), has
been exercised to delineate its practices and procedures. Chapter XV of the Rules of
the Court of Claims governs Wunderlich Act review of administrative disputes clause
determinations, although it is clear that this chapter is intended to supplement, rather
than supplant, the other rules of the court. See C. CL. R. 161; Anthony & White, supra,
at 297.
The Court of Claims' refusal to recognize its role as an appellate court reviewing
only the record in Wunderlich Act cases has led to some confusion over terminology.
Thus, the court, in reviewing an administrative record, still utilizes terms more appropri-
ately applied to de novo review such as "summary judgment" and "counterclaim." Al-
though it is realized that these terms are anomalous in appellate-type review proceedings,
in order not to add to the confusion most commentators have utilized these misapplied
terms when discussing the Court of Claims. This Note will conform to that convention.
24. See Wagner Whirler & Derrick Corp. v. United States, 121 F. Supp. 664, 667
(Ct. Cl. 1954).
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were equally binding on both parties to the contract.25 The plain
language of the Wunderlich Act applies to "any such decision," not
merely those unfavorable to contractors.26 While the government is
not able to appeal unfavorable board decisions to the Court of Claims
directly,27 prior to the Supreme Court's decision in S & E Contractors,
Inc. v. United States2" the government was able to obtain judicial re-
view indirectly merely by refusing to pay administrative disputes
awards that the General Accounting Office ruled were unjustified,
thereby forcing the contractor to bring a Tucker Act29 suit to collect
the monies due it, which the Department of Justice would defend by as-
sailing the validity of the award under Wunderlich Act standards. This
process seemed permissible and was found appropriate by the Court of
Claims because the Wunderlich Act prohibits the inclusion of any
25. See text accompanying notes 14-15 supra. Within a month after the Wunderlich
case was decided, its restricted standard of review was applied against the government
in Leeds & Northrup Co. v. United States, 101 F. Supp. 999 (E.D. Pa. 1951). In Leeds
& Northrup, the contractor brought an action for summary judgment in a district court
to recover an amount awarded to it by the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts under a
contract disputes procedure. The government counterclaimed and refused to pay the
award, claiming a set-off for an earlier award under a previous contract allegedly made
and paid by mistake. The court granted summary judgment for the contractor as to its
claim and as to the portion of the government's counterclaim which only the GAO be-
lieved was paid incorrectly under the previous contract but denied summary judgment
for the contractor as to that portion of the government's counterclaim which both the
GAO and the Navy thought should not have been awarded under the earlier contract.
Id. at 1003.
26. 41 U.S.C. § 321 (1970). The Act is quoted in full in note 20 supra. "The
language of this provision makes no reference or qualification as to who may seek judi-
cial review; rather, it deals with the scope of judicial review, and it states a general rule
which applies to 'any' administrative decision made pursuant to a government contract
." 48 NoT DAm LA.. 483, 491 (1972).
In his dissent to the S & E Contractors decision, Justice Brennan said: "It is im-
possible to read the plain words of this statute as directing that judicial review is avail-
able only for disputes decisions unfavorable to contractors. Indeed, the language is so
clear that there should be no need to search through the legislative history for a contrary
meaning. That history, in any event, demonstrates that the Act means exactly what it
says." 406 U.S. at 58. A substantial portion of this dissent and an appendix to it are
devoted to an analysis of the legislative history of the Wunderlich Act. Id. at 47-60,
69-90. The concurring opinion written by Justice Blackmun found this legislative his-
tory "decidedly ambiguous at best" on this issue, id. at 22, and the majority also adopted
this position, id. at 13 n.9.
27. The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (Supp. II 1972), amending 28 U.S.C. H8
1491, 1503 (1970), gives the Court of Claims jurisdiction to hear suits brought against
the government but does not grant jurisdiction to hear government-initiated claims. See
note 23 supra.
28. 406 U.S. 1 (1972). For commentary on this case, see Pasley; 48 NoTaR DAME
LAw. 483 (1972); 25 U. FLA. L. REv. 400 (1973).
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (Supp. II 1972), amending 28 U.S.C. § 1491, 1503 (1970).
See note 23 supra.
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clause making administrative decisions completely final and makes no
exception for decisions sustaining the contractor.80
However, this position was repudiated by the Supreme Court in
S & E Contractors. In that case, the contractor sought payment of a
favorable award made by the contracting agency, the Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC), under a disputes clause in a contract which called
for the construction of a testing facility. The AEC subsequently re-
fused to pay the award after the Comptroller General reviewed the
AEC proceedings and concluded the payment voucher could not be
certified. The contractor asserted the finality of the AEC's disputes
decision against the Department of Justice, which defended the suit
on the ground that the AEC's decision was not supported by substantial
evidence and was erroneous as a matter of law.81 Relying upon prece-
dent,8 2 the Court of Claims sanctioned the indirect invocation of judi-
cial review by the government's withholding of the award, stating "the
government has the right to the same extent as the contractor to seek
judicial review of an unfavorable administrative decision on a contract
claim." 33 Reversing in an opinion written by Mr. Justice Douglas, the
Supreme Court, without distinguishing between questions of law and
questions of fact,8 4 held that an agency's disputes clause determination
is binding on the government, absent fraud on the part of the contrac-
tor,35 that neither the disputes clause nor the Wunderlich Act em-
powered review of the AEC's decision by the General Accounting
Office,3 and that the Wunderlich Act does not give the Department
of Justice the right to appeal an administrative disputes decision.87 As
the rationale for its decision, the Court looked to the general policy
underlying the disputes clause and found it was "intended, absent fraud
or bad faith, to provide a quick and efficient administrative remedy
30. C.J. Langenfelder & Son, Inc., v. United States, 341 F.2d 600, 607 (CL C.
1965); accord, Acme Process Equip. Co. v. United States, 347 F.2d 538 (Ct. C1. 1965);
see Kipps, The Right of the Government to Have Iudicial Review of a Board of Contract
Appeals Decision Made Under the Dispute Clause, 2 Put. CoNTrnArs LJ. 286, 296
(1969).
31. S & E Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 433 F.2d 1373, 1374-75 (CL CL
1970), rev'd, 406 U.S. 1 (1972).
32. This body of precedent is discussed in note 13 supra.
33. 433 F.2d at 1378.
34. But see 406 U.S. at 30-31 (Brennan, I., dissenting).
35. Id. at 15.
36. 406 U.S. at 9. The majority noted that in enacting the Wunderlich Act, Con-
gress defeated proposals which would have given the Comptroller General such a power
of review. Id. at 11.
37. Id. at 12-13.
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and to avoid 'vexatious and expensive and, to the contractor oftentimes,
ruinious litigation.' "38
Further, the majority noted that the committee reports accom-
panying the Wunderlich Act indicated that limited "judicial review was
provided so that contractors would not inflate their bids to take into
account the uncertainties of administrative action" and that this goal
would be defeated if outside agencies such as the GAO or Department
of Justice were allowed to intervene in the disputes process.3 9 Charac-
terizing the S & E situation as one of agency intermeddling, however,
the Court left open the possibility that finality of a disputes decision
could be avoided by repudiation on the merits by the contracting
agency making the initial award, as contrasted with review by an out-
side agency. 40
THR COUNTERCLAIM PROBLEM
While barring the government from obtaining judicial review of
adverse agency disputes decisions either directly by bringing suit or in-
directly by refusing to pay a board award, S & E Contractors did not
explicitly explore the right of the government to counterclaim when
a private contractor seeks judicial review of a partially favorable ad-
ministrative determination. Although the majority in S & E Contrac-
tdrs was obviously concerned with the problem of the finality of agency
disputes decisions, its reasoning in this regard was also influenced by
the unfairness of one agency reversing a determination, favorable to
a contractor, made by another agency. Subsequently, the Court of
Claims has grappled with S & E Contractors' finality and fairness poli-
cies in deciding several cases which have not involved the additional
factor of outside agency interference.
Dynalectron Corp. v. United States,41 which appears to be the first
Court of Claims case to consider the counterclaim issue after the S & E
Contractors decision, involved a procurement contract for certain air-
38. Id. at 8.
39. Id. at 14. More generally, "[a] citizen has the right to expect fair dealings
from his government,... and this entails in the present context treating the government
as a unit rather than as an amalgam of separate entities. Here the AEC spoke for the
United States and its decision ... should be honored." Id. at 10. The Court refused
to construe the Wunderlich Act as requiring a citizen to present his claim before several
agencies in order to obtain justice from the government. Id. at 14.
40. The Court was careful to add that "[tihis case does not involve the situation
where an administrative agency, upon timely petition for rehearing or prompt sua sponte
reconsideration, determines that its earlier decision was wrong and, for that reason, re-
fuses to abide by it." Id. at 18-19.
41. 199 Ct. Cl. 996 (1972).
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craft antenna systems which proved defective, causing the government
to terminate the contract. The Board of Contract Appeals upheld the
termination by the government, but held the contractor was not liable
for reprocurement costs because the government was at fault in provid-
ing deficient specifications, and in fact had later reprocured a different
type of antenna.42  When the contractor brought suit in the Court of
Claims challenging the default termination, the government counter-
claimed for its excess reprocurement costs. The court dismissed this
counterclaim by holding flatly that "the decision of the Supreme Court
in S & E Contractors. . .precludes the government from obtaining re-
view, under Wunderlich Act standards, of the Board's decision,' 4"
without further explanation.
In a 1974 case heard by all of its judges, Roscoe-Ajax Construction
Co. v. United States," the Court of Claims undertook a more detailed
and definitive consideration of the counterclaim problem45 and held
42. Dynalectron Corp.-Pacific Div., 69-1 CCH Bd. Cont. App. Dec. 7595, at
35,265 (Armed Services Bd. of Contract Appeals 1969), aird on other grounds, 199 Ct.
Cf. 996 (1972).
43. 199 Ct. Cl. at 997.
44. 499 F.2d 639 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
45. In two cases decided after Dynalectron, the court circumvented the counter-
claim issue. In Boeing Co. v. United States, 480 F.2d 854 (Ct. Cl. 1973), the contrac-
tor asserted that it was entitled to allocate certain state and local taxes assessed on its
property to the cost of performing the contract while the government counterclaimed
with respect to other taxes which had previously been found allocable to the government
by the ASBCA. The trial commissioner's preliminary report cited S & E Contractors as
standing for the proposition that a court is unable to review in any way an agency dis-
putes decision favorable to a contractor, but the Court of Claims deemed it unnecessary
to resolve that controversy. Id. at 856. Instead, the court unanimously concluded that
the government had stated no case on the merits against the board decision and avoided
resolving the uncertainties of the counterclaim problem inherent in the Wunderlich Act
and the S & E Contractors decision. Id.
Another method of avoiding the counterclaim was employed in a 1974 case, Sea-
Land Serv., Inc. v. United States, 493 F.2d 1357 (Ct. Cl. 1974), cert. denied, 95
S. Ct. 69 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1974). There, the dispute centered on the exchange of
three vessels owned by Sea-Land for three vessels owned by the government pursuant
to a contract under the Vessel Exchange Act, 46 U.S.C. § 1160(i) (1970). Sea-Lahd
brought a Wunderlich suit in the Court of Claims challenging the values assigned to the
ships by the contracting officer, which had been upheld by the Assistant Secretary of
Commerce for Maritime Affairs. The government asserted a compulsory counterclaim
under Court of Claims Rule 40(a) for an amount representing the plaintiff's alleged li-
ability for certain repairs to the ships under a separate use agreement which chartered
the vessels traded by Sea-Land back to it while the vessels traded by the government
were being converted into container ships. Although the counterclaim was challenged
by the contractor, the court did not consider it on its merits because under the logic
of the Anthony Grace decision, United States v. Anthony Grace & Sons, Inc., 384 U.S.
424 (1966) (discussed in note 23 supra), the issues presented by it should have been
before the administrative agency for initial consideration, and therefore judicial proceed-
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that when a government contractor seeks judicial review under Wun-
derlich Act standards of a partially favorable Armed Services Board
of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) determination of a contractual dispute,
the government may assert counterclaims with respect to those portions
of the Board's decision which constitute part of the same dispute which
was brought by the plaintiff contractor.46
In that case, a government procurement contract between Roscoe-
Ajax and the Army Corps of Engineers provided for the construction
of fifty-six missile launcher shelters. Roscoe-Ajax entered into a sub-
contract for the installation of roof-and-door-opening mechanisms on
the shelters. Numerous difficulties arose in the completion of this
phase of the project, and several modifications ordered by the gov-
ernment were incorporated into the contract and subcontract in the
course of its performance. The contract contained a disputes clause
which provided for three levels of administrative determination and re-
view of the amount due Roscoe-Ajax as a result of any modifications
directed by the government in the performance of the contract.47
In seeking judicial review of the ASBCA decision in the Court
of Claims under Wunderlich Act standards, Roscoe-Ajax contested the
Board's failure to include an additional sum of money in its calculation
but did not attack any of the Board's factual determinations as to the
quantum of adjustment for any of the series of contract modifications.48
ings on the counterclaim were suspended for six months pending administrative resolu-
tion. 493 F.2d at 1372.
46. 499 F.2d at 646.
47. Roscoe-Ajax Constr. Co., Inc., 71-1 CCH Bd. Cont. App. Dec. 8828, at
41,035 (Armed Services Bd. of Contract Appeals 1971), modified, 18 CCH Cont. Cas.
F. 82,224 (1973) (report of the Trial Commissioner of the Court of Claims), afl'd,
499 F.2d 639 (Ct. Cl. 1974). At the initial stage of the disputes process, Roscoe-
Ajax presented claims for increased costs incurred by its subcontractor to a contracting
officer, who rendered a decision awarding Roscoe-Ajax $144,065. See Rosecoe-Ajax
Constr. Co. v. United States, 18 CCIi Cont. Cas. F. 82,224, at 87,475-76 (1973) (re-
port of the Trial Commissioner of the Court of Claims), affd, 499 F.2d 639 (Ct. Cl.
1974). Dissatisfied with the amount of this award, Roscoe-Ajax pursued the second
stage of the administrative process established in the disputes clause by appealing to the
Corps of Engineers Board of Contract Appeals. Although the Engineer Board deter-
mined that Roscoe-Ajax was unable to prove its entitlement to the full amount awarded
by the contracting officer, the board affirmed the contracting officer's award as equitable
in light of the lack of definite proof of certain costs. See 18 CCH Cont. Cas. F. f
82,224, at 87,476. Still dissatisfied, Roscoe-Ajax appealed to the ASBCA, where a de
novo hearing was held, and the government filed a counterclaim asserting it was entitled
to recover certain overpayments from the contractor. 71-1 CCH Bd. Cont. App. Dec.
8828, at 41,036. The counterclaim arose out of the discrepancy between the contract-
ing officer's award and the Engineer Board's finding on the amount the contractor was
able to prove it was owed, and the ASBCA entered a money judgment allowing the gov-
ernment partial recovery of the amount for which it counterclaimed. Id. at 41,060.
48. 409 F.2d at 641. The specific objections were that two modifications ordered
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The government, seeking a larger overpayment recovery than that
awarded to it by the ASBCA, filed a counterclaim which sought a re-
computation of the quantum of equitable adjustments allowable to the
contractor for the individual changes in performance.4 9
Confronted with the problem of whether or not the S & E Contrac-
tors interpretation of the Wunderlich Act's effect on the finality of a
Board of Contract Appeals decision permitted a government counter-
claim, the majority opinion in Roscoe-Ajax, joined by five of the seven
judges of the Court of Claims, initially distinguished the case at bar
from the fact situation in S & E Contractors. According to the Court
of Claims, "S & E Contractors obviously controls where the claimant
accepts the agency decision in toto, but gives no flat directive where,
as here, the contractor brings suit attacking a part of the administrative
decision which is unfavorable to him."'50 The court then examined the
diametrically opposed positions advanced by the parties. The govern-
ment contended that S & E Contractors did not foreclose the counter-
claim issue and that a contractor's acceptance of an administrative dis-
putes decision is an all-or-nothing proposition: if any part of the deci-
sion is challenged by the contractor, the government may then attack
any other determination. The court rejected this "decision standard"
because the joinder and docketing of issues in a single administrative
proceeding often depends upon irrelevant factors, such as the time at
which claims arise or the order in which they are decided by the con-
tracting officer, and it would be "inimical to a fair and rational disputes
procedure to leave the important question of absolute finality solely to
by the contracting officer were independent increases in the contract price and not par-
tial payments of the amount found due on various changes by the ASBCA and therefore
that the government audit incorrectly totalled the sums due the contractor. Id. at 641-
42. The Court of Claims regarded this as an attempt to have part of the increased costs
included in the final disputes award twice and denied this double recovery. Id. at 642.
49. Id. at 648-49. In addition, the government contended that the board committed
a legal error by considering a claim designated item W in making its findings and that
it was also error for the board to deny the government interest of six percent on the
overpayment. Id. at 648 n.14. The Corps of Engineers contested Roscoe-Ajax's entitle-
ment in the de novo proceeding before the ASBCA because this claim (item W) was
never presented to the contracting officer. It involved the cost of preparing a detailed
engineering study undertaken to rebut allegations by the contracting officer that certain
hydraulic components used in the roof-opening mechanisms did not meet government
specifications. 71-1 CCH Bd. Cont. App. Dec. 8828, at 41,053.
50. 499 F.2d at 643. The case came before the Court of Claims on cross-motions
for summary judgment and was referred to a trial commissioner for a preliminary report.
In some ways presaging the decision of the court, the Trial Commissioner concluded that
"[hiaving no right to seek judicial review ... in its own right, the defendant should
not be permitted to use plaintiff's petition as a vehicle by which to obtain judicial review
of factual determinations wholly unrelated to the errors assigned by the plaintiff." 18
CCH Cont. Cas. F. 82,224, at 87,477 (emphasis added).
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such chance (or tactical) elements." 51  Further, the court recognized
that adoption of such an all-encompassing waiver of immunity from
government claims could lead to precisely the type of vexatious and
potentially ruinous litigation S & E Contractors aimed at preventing.5 2
Conversely, Roscoe-Ajax proposed that every administrative finding or
determination accepted by the contractor should be final against the
government. The court repudiated this "finding standard" by stating
that
[s]uch one-sidedness runs against the grain. Where there is but a single
integral dispute, it is discriminatory to allow one party to take unchal-
lengeable advantage of all elements in the administrative decision which
are favorable to his position while putting the other side to the test of
supporting all the aspects favorable to it. A concern for striking a fair
balance. . . was prominent in the prevailing S & E opinions.5 3
After rejecting these extreme positions, the court discussed what
it perceived to be "the principle at the heart of S & E Contractors-
the full acceptance by that contractor of the. . . resolution of its dis-
pute with the [government], so that the particular dispute was wholly
ended."54 Designating its criterion as the "dispute standard," in con-
trast to the "decision" and "finding" standards of the respective par-
ties, the court characterized its task as one of defining the particular
dispute involved and determining whether the contractor had accepted
the administrative resolution of that dispute or whether it was being
kept alive by him in court. If a specific dispute is no longer alive
because the contractor is satisfied, the court would not allow the gov-
ernment to challenge it by way of counterclaim if the contractor chose
to litigate some other dispute, even if both disputes arose under the
same agreement or were resolved in the same board decision. 5
The majority conceded that defining the bounds of a single dis-
pute is a difficult task no less elusive than delineating a "claim" for
purposes of applying res judicata or other principles hinging on such
a determination. In attempting to enunciate such a definition, the
court stated that "Etihis concept of the 'same dispute' . . .encom-
51. 499 F.2d at 644.
52. "It is vital to the proper functioning of this system, as evaluated and applied
by the Supreme Court in S & E Contractors, that a contractor not be forced to risk what
he has gained before the agency-regardless of the lack of, or minimal connection be-
tween, the favorable and adverse components of its determination-whenever he seeks
Wunderlich Act review of an unfavorable portion of an administrative decision:' Id.
at 644.
53. Id. at 645.
54. Id. at 646.
55. Id.
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passes, in general, those aspects of a controversy which are so related
to one another that they form parts of a whole and ought to be decided
together."5 0 While the court went on to spell out a two-prong test of
what constitutes a dispute, centering on (1) the treatment of the matter
by the parties and the ASBCA, and (2) the legal, logical, and practical
relationships among the issues involved, it also cautioned that neither
of these components is dispositive.57
56. Id. The compulsory counterclaim rule of the Court of Claims embraces a some-
what similar notion by providing in relevant part that the government's "answer shall
state as a counterclaim any claim which. .. arises out of the transaction or occurrence
that is the subject matter of the [contractor's] petition.... ." Cr. CL. R. 40(a).
57. 499 1.2d at 647-48. The majority opinion applied its two-pronged dispute
standard to the facts in Roscoe-Ajax in the following manner. Since the contractor
challenged only the computational methods of the ASBCA, a legal issue, while the first
part of the government's counterclaim sought to reopen factual findings as to the amount
awarded for a certain modification and the assignment of a fifteen percent overhead rate
to the subcontractor, the court found that separate disputes were involved, and thus the
government could not raise that portion of the counterclaim. Id. at 649. "It is as if
the plaintiff, accepting all the individual amounts, were merely claiming that the Board
made a mathematical error in adding up these individual amounts, and the defendant
took that as its cue for asking the court for reexamination of the underlying factual de-
terminations of all the individual costs." Id.
A second aspect of the government's challenge was the contention that the board
committed legal error by considering a claim designated item W in assessing the award.
See note 49 supra. Again the court found separate disputes, but went on to resolve the
question on the merits, observing that "[i]n some instances, it may be easier to decide
against the defendant on the merits than to wrestle initially with the problem of whether
the counterclaim is maintainable at all." Id. at 650 n.17. Here the court found that
the government failed to object to the introduction of this matter at the hearings before
the Engineer Board and the ASBCA and thereby waived its right to do so later.
The third element of the government's counterclaim asserted its entitlement to six
percent interest on the overpayment recovery awarded to it by the ASBCA. As to this
aspect of the counterclaim, the court found a single dispute vis-i-vis the plaintiff's com-
putational objection, but ruled against the government on the merits because it had ini-
tially supported use of the accounting method which led to the overpayment and there-
fore was in no position as a matter of fairness to demand interest on its overpayment.
Id. at 650.
In Northland Camps, Inc. v. United States, 499 F.2d 658 (Ct. Cl. 1974), a compan-
ion case to Roscoe-Ajax, the Court of Claims again applied the dispute standard. North-
land Camps sought Wunderlich Act review of an ASBCA decision that it was liable for
the cost of repairing certain electrical defects in air conditioners it had supplied for gov-
ernment trailer-type housing, and the government counterclaimed, challenging the
board's refusal to also grant it the cost of adding front baffle plates and side windshields
to the air conditioners. The plaintiff then moved to dismiss the counterclaim. The
opinion, which confined itself to applying the guidelines set forth in Roscoe-Ajax, held
that both claims were "integral parts of the same contract dispute and should be decided
together." Id. at 659. The court found it "hard to envisage a closer physical connection
and interrelationship," id., and noted that the board treated both demands "as part of
the same fabric," id. at 660. Moreover, Northland's petition expressly raised two issues
-whether it was responsible for design of the trailers and whether any of the defects
in the air conditioners were latent-which involved legal and factual considerations com-
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Judge Nichols, dissenting from that part of the majority opinion
which dismissed the government's counterclaim, noted that the major-
ity's standard would produce more expense, delay, and uncertainty in
the already complex area of Wunderlich Act litigation and that its ap-
plication would require a thorough and detailed knowledge of the par-
ticular facts of each case. After reviewing the precedent in the area,
Judge Nichols suggested what he viewed as a more fruitful approach
which would delineate a dispute by ascertaining the items the parties
would normally trade off in the negotiation process. 58
ANALYSIS OF THE Roscoe-Ajax "DIsPUTE" STANDARD
Although the Tucker Act, the basic jurisdictional provision em-
powering the Court of Claims to hear contractor-initiated government
contract cases, permits counterclaims, 59 the real question is whether the
S & E Contractors interpretation of the Wunderlich Act makes agency
decisions so final as applied against the government as to preclude
counterclaims when the private contractor judicially appeals a portion
of an administrative disputes determination.
As stated by the Supreme Court in S & E Contractors, the primary
purpose of the disputes clause in government contracts is to eliminate
vexatious, expensive litigation which could be potentially ruinous to the
contractor. Although Roscoe-Ajax may invite vexatious counter-
claims by the government, it will do so only within the presumably nar-
row bounds of a single dispute which a contractor has decided to raise.
Moreover, the dispute standard and the limited counterclaim it permits
may have the beneficial effect of discouraging frivolous litigation by
contractors who would have little but the costs of litigation to lose if
the government were bound by all administrative decisions favorable
to the contractor and were not permitted to challenge anything by way
of counterclaim. 61
mon to both the claim and the counterclaim. Since a single unresolved dispute was in-
volved, the court found the government was entitled to pursue its counterclaim and de-
nied the contractor's motion to dismiss, returning the case to the Trial Commissioner
for further proceedings.
58. Id. at 657 (Nichols, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
If the parties and the Board treat as related parts of one "dispute" what appears
to be on its face an unrelated series of claim items, I would presume, if not
irrebuttably, at least strongly, that they know what they are doing ....
Within the ordinary contract "dispute" a list of several claims items lists
counters to be played on the same checkerboard. Such counters have a rela-
tionship in the minds of the players, and we do not always understand their
play. Id. at 656.
59. See 28 U.S.C. § 1503 (1970). See note 23 supra.
60. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
61. See 499 F.2d at 645.
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The most convincing argument against allowing government
counterclaims regarding board of contract appeals decisions adverse
to the government is that the government should not be able to contest
what is, in effect, its own decision.62 Of course, this argument assumes
that when the board announces a decision favorable to the contractor,
an agreement has been reached and a dispute no longer exists. Cer-
tainly it would seem that some area of dispute could be said to be still
alive if the contractor invoked judicial review of part of that decision,
thereby rejecting at least some part of the government's settlement
offer. From this perspective, the dispute standard set forth in Roscoe-
Ajax seems quite proper and in harmony with the other policies es-
poused in S & E Contractors. That is, a unitary notion of government
would be preserved, and the contractor would not be forced to present
his claims before several agencies in order to obtain justice since he
would be seeking judicial review voluntarily and the possibility of a
limited government counterclaim presumably would not inject the same
uncertainties and motivation for inflating bids as might additional chal-
lenges by different parts of the bureaucracy. 8
In discussing the potential cost to taxpayers which could result from
the S & E Contractors decision and the need to balance the interests
of both parties to a government contract, Mr. Justice Brennan's dissent-
ing opinion in S & E Contractors properly interjected a consideration
seemingly overlooked by the majority in that case-the fairness of the
decision to the government.64 Although the concurring opinion in the
case emphasized that the rights of the government are adequately pro-
tected in the disputes process,65 not all commentators have agreed.6
62. S & E Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 406 U.S. 1, 10 (1972); id. at 20
(Blackmun, J., concurring); Comment, S & E Contractors and the GAO Role in Govern-
ment Contract Disputes: A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Finality, 55 VA. L.
Rv. 762, 778 (1969).
63. See text accompanying note 39 supra. There would be no forced imposition of
an additional tier of federal review which the Court found objectionable in S & E Con-
tractors, 406 U.S. at 4, since the contractor would be invoking judicial review by his
own choice. It is important to note that in Roscoe-Ajax there was lacking the element
of outside agency intermeddling, which the dissent in the S & E decision properly charac-
terized as the majority's bete noire. Id. at 62 (Brennan, I., dissenting).
64. Justice Brennan's dissent in S & E Contractors saw the majority position as de-
stroying the former balance between government and contractor, see id. at 31, at a po-
tential cost to taxpayers of "countless millions," id. at 60. But see Pasley 35-36, where
it is argued that Justice Brennan's characterization is exaggerated and that the practical
impact of S & E Contractors will not be very great.
65. The issue is not whether advantage is or is not to be taken of the Govern-
ment. Of course, the Government's rights are to be protected. That protec-
tion, however, is afforded by the nature and workings of the contract disputes
system, by its emphasis on expeditious performance and getting the job done,
and by the presence of the contracting officer and the agency. . . . 406 U.S.
at 23 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
66. Regardless of the philosophical and legal arguments that have been made
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Even conceding that "there is a general feeling among contractors that
the contractor's unilateral right of appeal serves to 'even up' a dispute
process that would otherwise be unduly loaded in favor of the govern-
ment,"' 7 it can be argued that S & E Contractors reinstated the kind
of nonreviewability the Wunderlich Act sought to avoid, at least with
regard to disputes decisions favoring the contractor.6 8 Thus, the S &
E Contractors decision "can be criticized as failing to Vive the Govern-
ment its 'day in court,' especially on questions of law, and as incon-
sistent with precedent, with the theory of suits under the Tucker Act,
and with the language of the Wunderlich Act."'69 In Roscoe-Ajax, the
Court of Claims appeared to be moving toward remedying this problem
by allowing judicial review of administrative disputes decisions adverse
to the government in certain limited situations, thereby correcting the
imbalance in favor of the contractor inherent in its initial reading of
the S & E Contractors decision in the Dynalectron case, which flatly
prohibited all government counterclaims. 70
in support of the contractor-only appeal system, it must be admitted that it is
inherently unfair [to the government] since the system itself exerts a tremen-
dous pressure on the boards in the direction of decisions that will not be upset
on appeal, namely, deciding for the only party having a right of appeal-the
contractor. .. The court has... not been dealing with anything like a bal-
anced or normal selection of appellate problems but has been considering the
'rejects' of a generally contractor and settlement-oriented system. Considered
in this light, the Government should prevail in far more of the court's decision
than it does. King & Little, supra note 23, at 8.
See also Little, The Procurement Commission Recommendations on Dispute Resolution,
42 GEo. WASH. L. Rnv. 306, 307 (1974).
67. Shedd, Disputes and Appeals: The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals,
29 LAW & CoNTEM,. PROB. 39, 73 (1964). This imbalance favoring the government
is said to exist for a number of reasons, including the fact that the government largely
imposes the terms of the contract, Hiestand & Williamson, The Procurement Commis-
sion's Contract Remedies & Award Protest Recommendations: A View from the Inside,
42 GEo. WASH. L. Rnv. 224, 229 (1974), the contractor bears the financial burden of
continuing performance in the face of changes or difficulties, 48 NoTRE DAM LAw. 483,
488 (1972), the "virtually unlimited ability of the government to litigate," Gantt, A Cri-
tique of the Disputes Resolution Recommendations, 42 Gno. WASH. L. REv. 288, 295
(1974), and the fact that a successful contractor cannot recover his litigation expenses
in the Court of Claims, id.; Anthony & White, supra note 23, at 403; Hiestand & Wil-
liamson, supra, at 229.
68. 25 U. FiA. L. Rnv. 400, 405 (1973). See text accompanying notes 16-24 supra.
69. Pasley 40. Since the Court in the S & E decision failed to differentiate between
finality for questions of law and for questions of fact, its holding, see text accompanying
notes 34-37 supra, would seem to prevent the government, at least in cases of agency
intermeddling, from obtaining indirect judicial review of questions of law as well as ques-
tions of fact. In his dissent to the S & E opinion, Mr. Justice Brennan criticized the
majority for misreading the Wunderlich Act, which expressly provides that administra-
tive disputes decisions are not final on questions of law. 406 U.S. at 30-31. See note
20 supra.
70. See text accompanying notes 41-43 supra.
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There are obviously competing interests in this area-the govern-
ment seeks timely and proper performance of the contract at the least
cost to the taxpayer, while the contractor seeks assurance of fair com-
pensation for bearing the burden of government-directed changes-
and a balancing of these interests is clearly necessary. While a govern-
ment contract should not be regarded as "a license for warfare" and
the savings to contractors who know that they will not have to function
in a hostile and litigious setting will be reflected in more competitive
bids from qualified contractors, 71 it can be argued that a contractor who
is inherently favored in litigation will be "encouraged to try to drive
harder bargains with the Government. ' 72  Obviously, this is an area
where the public interest should not be ignored in striking a balance,
and in a search for this balance the dispute standard adopted in Roscoe-
Ajax, allowing limited counterclaims by the government, is preferable
to a "finding standard" precluding all government counterclaims, 73 a
position which would jeopardize the public interest by allowing the con-
tractor to risk nothing but the cost of litigation in coming to court, as
well as a "decision standard" permitting all counterclaims, 74 a position
which would tip the scales too far in the other direction by allowing
the kind of vexatious government challenges S & E Contractors sought
to preclude. Moreover, permitting a limited government counter-
claim might protect the contractor from unbalanced appeals board deci-
sions. If the board of contract appeals realized that the contractor
could appeal all unfavorable administrative determinations, while fa-
vorable decisions by the board would remain sacrosanct, whenever the
board decided that the contractor should lose on the merits it might
steamroll the opinion by deleting any intermediate findings favoring
the contractor in a decision ultimately unfavorable to him.75
Perhaps the greatest virtue of the dispute standard formulated in
Roscoe-Ajax is its flexibility; the court was admirably unwilling to opt
for a mechanistic test in a highly complex area of law where a decision
should hinge on the facts of each particular case. Counterbalancing
this, however, are the problems inherent in applying such a vague
standard, which were effectively exposed by Judge Nichols' dissent in
Roscoe-Ajax.70 Perhaps the greatest of these is the familiarity with
71. Little, supra note 66, at 310.
72. King & Little, supra note 23, at 10.
73. See text following note 50 supra.
74. See text accompanying note 53 supra.
75. See Roscoe-Ajax Constr. Co. v. United States, 499 F.2d 639, 653-54 (Ct. C1.
1974) (Nichols, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
76. See note 58 supra and accompanying text,
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the peculiar facts of each case that will be required to delineate what
falls within the boundaries of a single dispute. In Wunderlich Act
cases, review is limited to the administrative record77 and it is arguable
that the court will not be able to gain the degree of factual intimacy
with the case necessary to apply the dispute test. Unfortunately, how-
ever, it seems fair to say that Judge Nichols' suggestion that disputes
be defined in terms of the perceptions of the parties as they engage
in the negotiation process would entail no less complexity and uncer-
tainty than the majority's position, at least if it would truly require prob-
ing the relationships perceived in the minds of the parties. 7  Further,
the same type of factual familiarity as that required by the majority's
dispute standard is presumably involved in deciding whether to give
res judicata effect to administrative disputes findings in separate judi-
cial proceedings for breaches of contract which do not fall within the
disputes clause and are therefore not subject to administrative resolu-
tion-a problem often faced by the Court of Claims.79
Another criticism, implicit in Judge Bennett's concurring opinion
in Roscoe-Ajax, is that in many instances it presumably would be less
time-consuming simply to decide the case on the merits.80  As sug-
gested by Judge Bennett, such judicial decisions on the merits, as con-
trasted with those that become entangled with the court's right to enter-
tain the claim, serve as a deterrent to unnecessary litigation, as a guide
77. See note 23 supra.
78. See note 58 supra and accompanying text.
79. For instance, in United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394
(1966), the Supreme Court made it clear that administrative findings of fact in disputes
cases are res judicata in later suits for breach of contract in the Court of Claims, stating
that
[o]ccasionally courts have used language to the effect that res judicata prin-
ciples do not apply to administrative proceedings, but such language is certainly
too broad. When an administrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity and
resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had
an adequate opportunity to litigate, the courts have not hesitated to apply resjudicata to enforce repose. Id. at 421-22.
In determining what constitutes a "claim" for res judicata purposes "the rule stresses the
transaction or occurrence as the subject matter of a claim rather than the legal rights
arising therefrom. . . . The term 'claim' is used to denote the aggregate of operative
facts which give rise to a right enforceable in the courts." United States v. Iroquois
Apartments, Inc., 21 F.R.D. 151, 153 (E.D.N.Y. 1957); accord, Original Ballet Russe,
Ltd. v. Ballet Theatre, Inc., 133 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1943); see 2 K. DAvis § 18.04, at
568 ("most problems of res judicata in administrative law involve collateral estoppel");
2 J. MooRE, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTIcE 2.06, at 361 (2d ed. 1974) (procedural notion
of "a set of facts which group themselves together conveniently for trial"); Note, The
Application of Res Judicata to Administrative Determinations, 1970 DUn L.. 133;
Note, supra note 13, at 658-60 (detailing the pros and cons of applying principles of
res judicata to contract appeal board determinations).
80. 499 F.2d at 652 (Bennett, J., concurring). This approach was taken in Boeing
Co. v. United States, 480 F.2d 854, 856 (Ct. Cl. 1973), discussed in note 45 supra.
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to agency officials in dealing with claims at lower levels, and as an in-
centive to the settlement of cases even after they have been taken to
court.8' However, in some cases, new factual issues could be raised
by a government counterclaim which would require a remand to the
board of contract appeals for initial determination,8" and thereby re-
sult in precisely the type of vexatious and potentially ruinous delay the
disputes clause aims at preventing. 83
Although the Roscoe-Ajax formulation of the dispute standard ar-
guably achieves a proper balance of fairness between the government
and the contractor, a literal reading of the standard does so at the ex-
pense of the finality provisions of the Wunderlich Act. Under that Act,
administrative determinations of fact are final unless certain limited
standards are met, while such determinations of law are not final and
are judicially reviewable without restriction. 84  While the demarcation
between questions of law and questions of fact is especially hazy in
government contract disputes, 85 the Wunderlich Act nevertheless man-
dates that that difficult determination be made. If the dispute stand-
ard is read literally to open up government counterclaims on questions
of fact which are part of the same dispute as the contractor's challenge
on a pure question of law, the Roscoe-Ajax formulation inappropriately
penalizes the contractor for exercising this right of review granted to
him without restriction by the Wunderlich Act. Thus, if the dispute
standard is to achieve legitimacy, it must be read so as to permit gov-
ernment counterclaims as to questions of fact only when the contractor
also seeks judicial review of an administrative determination of fact.86
81. Spector 161.
82. See United States v. Anthony Grace & Sons, Inc., 384 U.S. 424 (1966), dis-
cussed in note 23 supra.
83. See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
84. See note 20 supra.
85. See generally Birnbaum, Questions of Law and Fact and the furisdiction of the
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, 19 FED. BJ. 120 (1959); Spector, "Law"
Is Where You Find It, or "Fact" Is in the Eye of the Beholder, 19 FED. B.. 212 (1959);
Note, Judicial Review of Government Contracts Disputes-The Law-Fact Dichotomy,
9 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 857 (1968).
86. Although the Roscoe-Ajax court used a broadly-worded formulation, it may in
application have recognized the fact-law limitation inherent in any Wunderlich Act re-
view case. For instance, in applying the dispute standard to the government's counter-
claim as to certain administrative factual determinations where the contractor sought re-
view in the Court of Claims of only the method of calculation-classified by the court
as a question of law-the Roscoe-Ajax court found them not to be part of the same dis-
pute. 499 F.2d at 649. See note 57 supra. Even though the court reached the correct
result, it did so in a rather cumbersome manner. Rather than applying the dispute
standard, it should have immediately stated that questions of law are explicitly prohibited
from being given finality under the Wunderlich Act, and since the contractor only
sought review of a question of law, the government should not be able to counterclaim
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CONCLUSION
At least within the confines of the present disputes system87 and
the guiding precedent of S & E Contractors, the decision of the Court
of Claims in Roscoe-Ajax Construction Co. v. United States permitting
limited government counterclaims seems a small step toward the basic
goal of insuring fairness to both parties to a government contract. While
the dispute standard may produce some uncertainty as to its scope and
therefore some wasteful litigation concerning the permissibility of gov-
ernment counterclaims, it will do so only when the contractor has
chosen to come into court. The ultimate impact of the decision may
not be great, however, because the government may be able to avail
itself of the loophole of agency reconsideration of disputes decisions
left open by S & E Contractors88 in those instances when the dispute
as to a question of fact. To reason otherwise would penalize a contractor for exercising
its statutory right to seek judicial review of a question of law.
87. Many commentators have suggested that only a legislative overhaul of the dis-
putes process can restore efficiency and a semblance of justice to the government pro-
curement system. The proposals are varied: some have advocated an all disputes clause
which would effectively eliminate the distinction between breach and "arising under"
claims, see note 4 supra, by allowing initial administrative determination of all contro-
versies in connection with the contract, King & Little, supra note 23, at 15-16; Moss,
Judicial Review of Federal Contract Appeals Decisions Today-The Necessity for an
All Disputes Procedure, 3 PuB. CONTACTS L.J 80, 95-96; see Pasley 37-38; others, an
election of remedies which would allow the contractor to appeal an adverse decision by
the contracting officer within the agency, or, alternatively, seek direct judicial review,
King & Little, supra note 23, at 15; Kipps, supra note 30, at 286; Spector 167; Spector,
Public Contract Claims Procedures-A Perspective, 30 FED. BJ. 1, 11 (1971); see Pas-
ley 38; others, an institutional approach involving a synthesis of the judicial and admin-
istrative models, Note, Government Contracts Disputes: An Institutional Approach, 73
YATn L.J. 1408 (1964); see Pasley 39; others, mandatory arbitration of disputes, King
& Little, supra note 23, at 12; 25 U. FLA. L. REv. 400, 407 (1973); and yet others allow-
ing de novo judicial review not limited to the administrative record, Spector 167; Spector,
Public Contract Claims Procedure, supra, at 11. A Committee on Government Procure-
ment conducted an intensive two-year study of government procurement and submitted
a report to Congress on December 31, 1972, containing, inter alia, extensive proposals
for reforming the present disputes system. See generally Spector; Symposium on Gov-
ernment Procurement: Comments on the Procurement Commission's Disputes Remedies
and Award Protest Recommendations, 42 GEo. WAsH. L. REV. 222 (1974). By a seven
to five vote, the Commission recommended allowing both contractors and the govern-
ment to seek judicial review of adverse agency disputes clause decisions, but Judge Spec-
tor cautions that the twelve recommendations made in the Report must be viewed as
a package and this particular proposal would entail merit only if the contractor "were
not compelled to expend the time and money involved in assuming the risk of such an
appeal, but could instead elect to proceed initially in the court." Spector 164.
Despite the proliferation of proposals for reform, it has been demonstrated that
existing procedures actually work quite well and "iflt is more than likely that such legis-
lation would create as many problems as it would solve." Pasley 37.
88. See note 40 supra.
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standard adopted in Roscoe-Ajax would preclude it from counter-
claiming in litigation brought by the contractor. But under current
procedures, an agency head cannot reverse a decision of a board of
contract appeals,8 9 and the requirement that board reconsideration
be "prompt"0 could make even the limited ability of the government
to maintain counterclaims recognized in Roscoe-Ajax an important ele-
ment in restoring the balance S & E Contractors seemed to ignore.
89. Pasley 22 & n.131; see 32 C.F.R. § 30.1(1) (1974); 41 C.F.R. § 5-60.101(a)
(1974).
90. 406 U.S. at 18.
